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How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? 
In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear 
upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an 
intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are 
often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this 
conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, 
real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this 
idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage 
to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. 
Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation 
between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources 
used for the on-line guidance of visuo-motor action, on the other. This ‘dual 
visual systems’ hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of 
cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of 
Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for  
an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of 






1. The Assumption of Experience-Based Control 
 
 
Here is Brian O’Shaugnessy’s description of the act of intentionally bringing 
one’s index finger down onto the center of a printed cross. During such an 
action, O’Shaugnessy suggests: 
 
one keeps looking as one guides the finger, and does so right up until the 
moment the finger contacts the cross, and the reason, surely, is that sight 
is continually informing one as to where in one’s visual field to move 
one’s visible physical finger 
(O’Shaughnessy, 1992, 233).  
 
 It is clear, from the larger text, that by “sight” O’Shaughnessy here means 
“conscious visual experience”.  But this assumption – that conscious visual 
experience provides the very information continuously used for visually based 
motor control – is precisely the one shortly to be challenged. Perhaps we keep 
looking not because our visual experience  (or its inner substrate) is itself guiding 
the action, but because other (non-conscious) inner systems are also, and 
simultaneously, using visually transduced information to guide behavior. 
 






Assumption of Experience-Based Control (EBC) 
 
Conscious visual experience presents the world to the subject in a 
richly textured way; a way that presents fine detail ( detail that 
may, perhaps,  exceed our conceptual or propositional grasp) and 
that is, in virtue of this richness, especially apt for, and typically 
utilized in, the control and guidance of fine-tuned, real-world 
activity. 
 
EBC is itself neutral, as far as I can see, with respect to the ongoing debate 
concerning the need (or lack of one) to acknowledge a so-called ‘nonconceptual’ 
component in the contents of many perceptual experiences2. But, as the 
parenthetical clause in EBC is meant to indicate, some version of EBC is often 
invoked as part of the characterization of the functional role of any (putatively) 
nonconceptual contents of conscious visual experience. Certain components of 
our conscious visual experiences, according to these accounts, may be said to be 
nonconceptual in the sense that they may occur in the absence of the concepts 
                                                 
2  A good entry point into this debate is Tim Crane 1992, especially  sections  2 and 3.  Also, Evans  1982 
Ch. 4, 6 and 7, Peacocke  1986, 1992a, Cussins  1990 and various papers in Crane (ed) 1992. 
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that an agent, or a theorist, might typically use in attempting to describe them. 
Such contents may thus figure in the conscious perceptual experiences of beings 
lacking such concepts (young infants, non-linguistic animals), as well as in the 
experiences of adult, linguistically skilled humans. The contents of our 
perceptual experiences, accordingly, may be much finer-grained than the 
concepts we use to describe them. Thus Jose Luis Bermudez comments that: 
 
The central impetus for legitimating a notion of 
nonconceptual content has come from the study of 
perceptual experience… Theorists have been attracted to 
nonconceptual content by the thought that the richness and 
grain of perceptual experience is not constrained by the concepts 
that a believer might or might not possess. 
 (Bermudez  1998, 50. My emphasis). 
 
Peacocke (1986)(1991) is likewise motivated by the need to accommodate “the 
remarkable range of detail in the perceptual content [and] the range of different , 
and philosophically interesting,  types of content that can be possessed by a 
particular experience” (Peacocke 1992b, 105).  To this end he develops, the notion 
of “scenario content”:  a type of representational content fixed by specifying how 
the physical space around the subject can be filled if the content is to be correct 
(1992b, 105-110). 
 
Driven as they are by this imagined gap between our concepts and certain 
conscious perceptual contents, appeals to the notion of nonconceptual content 
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face an obvious challenge. The challenge is to say what then makes it the case 
that some specific nonconceptual content is present and figures in an agent’s 
conscious perceptual experience. This is where something like EBC seems to 
enter the scene. For the appeal to verbal report, drawing as it does upon a 
subject’s conceptualized grasp of the visual scene, looks relatively impotent 
here3 . To meet this challenge, many theorists of nonconceptual content appeal to 
various kinds of link with action. The nonconceptual contents of perceptual 
experience are thus often depicted as being at least partially constituted by their 
roles in guiding various forms of world-involving action. Thus Peacocke speaks 
of a profound “connection … between the nonconceptual content of perception 
and bodily action” (Peacocke 1992b, 131).  In describing the specific role of 
scenario content in human action, Peacocke claims that “perception supplies that 
nonconceptual information in a form immediately usable if the subject wants to 
move his body … towards … what he perceives” (ibid).  Gareth Evans, in a 
(1985) paper entitled “Molyneux’s Question”, suggests that the nonconceptual 
content of a sensation is in part a function of the organism’s sensorimotor skills – 
a function of the way the perceptual experience could be used to guide various 
kinds of skilled activity.  Speaking of the way we can hear a sound as coming 
from a certain location, Evans  famously claims that: 
 
                                                 
3  But note the recent  literature concerning the possible role of demonstratives in characterizing  even very  
fine-grained perceptual  contents. See Peacocke  1998, McDowell 1998b 
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the complex property of auditory input which codes the 
direction of the sound acquires a spatial content for an 
organism by being linked with behavioral ouput. 
 
 (Evans  1985, 385) 
 
Grush (1998) notes that this is not to claim that the experience must actually lead 
to skilled sensorimotor response, nor even that the organism be currently capable 
of such response (it may have the skills but be injured or paralyzed and unable to 
use them).  The idea is just that the experience (by which I shall always mean 
‘conscious experience’) must, in normal conditions, normally serve to guide  
skilled sensorimotor engagements.  It is this capacity to guide action that, 
according to Evans, imbues the experience with spatial content4. 
 
As a final example, consider Adrian Cussins description5 of the skilled 
motorcyclist’s nonconceptual knowledge of her speed. The motorcyclist, Cussins 
points out, may not know that her speed is, say, around 70 mph. But she may 
                                                 
 
4 Evans’ overall account, however, is complicated by an important wrinkle.  He 
depicts  conscious experience as resulting when “the inner states which have a 
content by virtue of their phylogenetically more ancient connections with the 
motor system also serve as input to the concept-exercising and reasoning 
system” (1982, 227).  The  content of conscious perceptual experience, on such a 
view, depends not just on appropriate connections with motor actions but also 
on the accessibility of that content to conceptualized thought.  Nonetheless, such 
access is depicted (Evans 1982, 159, Davies 1997, 312) as taking place without 
transforming the nonconceptual content of the perceptual experience into a 
conceptual one.  
 
5  The example was given in Cussins’ presentation to the Eastern  APA, Washington, 1998, and is 
reproduced with the author’s permission. 
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nonetheless have a precise sense of how fast she is going: a sense fully manifest, 
Cussins argues, in the skilled responses and micro-adjustments made while she 
is in control of the bike. The conscious-but-nonconceptual content of her 
experience of speed is thus cashed out as a matter of  
 
“knowingly making micro-adjustments of … speed … in response to 
changing road conditions”  
(Cussins  1998, 10) 
and as: 
 “hands on engaged knowledge … manifested in experience-guided activity 
and potential activity” 
 (Cussins 1998, 22, my emphasis). 
 
I conclude that, in several influential treatments (Evans, Peacocke, Cussins), a 
notion of the nonconceptual content of conscious perceptual experience is, prima 
facie, being required to play a dual role: to reflect, on the one hand, the nature 
and grain of our conscious experience; and to make intimate contact, on the other 
hand, with the ongoing control of motor activity.  What holds these two strands 
together is the perfectly commonsensical (but potentially false) Assumption of 
Experience-Based Control. This assumption thus plays a special role in attempts 
to legitimate a notion of nonconceptual content. But it is equally implicated both 
in a certain intuitive picture of the functional role of conscious visual experience 
(roughly, that we use conscious seeing to guide fine motor activity) and in any 
philosophical account which seeks to fix the contents of perceptual experience 
(whether conceptualized or not) by invoking direct links with action. . Certain 
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teleosemantic accounts (eg Millikan (1984) may thus be equally at risk, as are 
accounts (such as  Dennett (1991)) which unpack experiential content in terms of 
undifferentiated patterns of  behavior and response.  
 
For what if – contrary to strong readings of EBC– our experiences don’t control 
our behavior, or do so only in a rather more indirect manner than we intuitively 
believe?  What if, to be blunt, experiential content and action-guiding content 
prove to be empirically quite distinct?  In the next two sections, I examine some 
evidence that seems to support just such a radical dissociation, and that sets the 




2. Visual Awareness and Visuomotor Control 
 
Despite the intuitive appeal of EBC, is is surely equally clear that a great deal of 
our daily, fine-tuned motor activity proceeds quite independently of the current 
contents of conscious visual experience. Thus consider the way we use visual 
information (as well as proprioceptive) information to make tiny, continuous 
postural adjustments while ‘standing still’ on a moving bus. In a controlled 
experiment, Lee and Lishman (1975) placed subjects in a room which was 
(unbeknownst to them) suspended from the ceiling of a larger room and was 
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gently swaying back and forth. The subjects were shown to be using both visual 
and prorioceptive information to make fine postural adjustments while 
remaining quite unaware of either these adjustments or of the gentle swaying of 
the room6. 
 
In another series of experiments subjects were required to both visually track and 
manually point out a visually presented target. This target, however, was 
sometimes suddenly (unexpectedly) slightly displaced after the original 
presentation. Bridgeman et al (1979) showed that subjects would accommodate 
this displacement (as evidenced by accurate saccades and pointing) whilst 
remaining quite unaware that the target had moved. Moreover, in those cases 
where the displacement was large enough to attract attention and hence to enter 
conscious awareness, the on-line adjustments were much less fluid and less 
successful (see Milner and Goodale, 1995, 161). To round this story off, Wong 
and Mack (1981) showed that subjects who automatically and unconsciously 
accommodate the smaller displacements will, if subsequently asked to point to 
the remembered location of the (now-removed) target, actually point to the 
original (non-displaced) location. Similar results have been obtained for grasping 
motions directed at present versus remembered visually-displayed objects (see 
Milner and Goodale 1995, 170-173). Memory-driven responses thus seem to be 
                                                 
6  This example is reported  in Milner   and  Goodale 1995, 175 
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tied to the contents of conscious visual experience, while on-line object-engaging 
performance is driven by a distinct and more sensitive resource. This alignment 
of memory with conscious visual experience is a matter to which we will later 
(section 4) return. 
 
None of this, I submit, will come as any surprise to an expert sportsplayer. In 
returning a fast tennis serve, to take an obvious example, one’s bodily 
adjustments and responses seem quite clearly to be governed by the unconscious 
use of visually processed information. More recent work on cognitive disabilities 
(and in cognitive neuroscience more generally) suggests, however, the perhaps 
unsuspected extent to which visually-based daily action is under the fine control 
of non-conscious visually-based processes. 
 
The most dramatic evidence of dissociation between conscious visual experience 
and vision-for-action is found in certain neurologically compromised patients. 
The patient DF, a victim of carbon monoxide poisoning suffering from 
widespread lesions of the so-called ventral visual stream (see fig.1 and 
description later in the text), cannot identify objects by sight (though she can do 
so by touch).  Nonetheless, she is able to pick up these very same objects – that 
she cannot visually identify – using fluent, well-oriented precision grips.  Others, 
by contrast, suffer dorsal stream lesions. These ‘optic ataxics’ : 
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have little trouble seeing [that is. identifying objects in a visual 
scene] but a lot of trouble reaching for objects they can see.  It is as 
though they cannot use the spatial information inherent in any 
visual scene 
 (Gazzaniga 1998, 109). 
 
 DF, while claiming that she cannot see the orientation of a displayed slit, can 
nonetheless (on demand) successfully ‘post’ a letter through the slit, with the 
letter pre-oriented so as to pass easily through. The optic ataxics, by contrast, are 
able to consciously perceive and report the orientation of the slit but are unable 
(and not due to any brute physical impairment) to pre-orient and post the letter. 
Such patients are aided somewhat if the slit is presented then removed, and the 
request is to orient the letter in the way that would have been appropriate were 
the slot still available. This allows the use of  a distinct, memory-based strategy. 
DF, by contrast, is unable to perform at all under this ‘delay’ condition. Once 
again, then, we see  tight links between memory and conscious visual awareness, 
and a dissociation between both of these and on-line object-engaged performance 
. DF cannot consciously perceive the orientation, nor can she succeed in the delay 
condition, while the optic ataxics can consciously perceive the orientation and 
actually do better in the delay condition- see Milner and Goodale 1995, 96-101, 
136-138.  
 
All of this, as Milner and Goodale stress, makes excellent computational sense. 
For fine-grained action-control requires the extraction and use of radically 
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different kinds of information (from the incoming visual signal) than does 
recognition, recall and reasoning. The former requires a constantly updated, 
egocentrically-specified, exquisitely distance and orientation sensitive encoding 
of the visual array. While the latter requires a degree of object-constancy, and the 
recognition of items by category and significance irrespective of the fine detail of 
location, viewpoint and retinal image size. A computationally efficient coding for 
either task precludes the use of the very same encoding for the other: a diagnosis 
also supported by work revealing the very different response characteristics of 
neurons in the dorsal and ventral streams (see Milner and Goodale, 1995, 25-66). 
 
The best interpretation of all these bodies of data, according to Milner and 
Goodale, is that memory and conscious visual experience depend on a type of 
mechanism and coding that is different from, and largely independent of, the 
mechanisms and coding used to guide visuomotor action in real-time.  The 
former, they suggest, depend on processing in the so-called ‘ventral stream’ 
leading from primary visual cortex to temporal areas.  While the latter (the 
action-guiding resources) depend on the ‘dorsal stream’ leading to parietal 
cortex (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1  Schematic diagram showing major routes whereby retinal 
input reaches the dorsal and ventral streams.  The inset shows the 
cortical projections on the right hemisphere of a macaque brain.  
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LGNd, lateral geniculate nucleus, pars dorsalis; Pulv, pulvinar 
nucleus; SC, superior colliculus. 
 
 
The general idea then, is that the ventral and dorsal visual streams (originally 
glossed as “what” and “where” pathways – see Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982) 
may be better glossed7 as “what” and “how” pathways, with the ventral (“what”) 
stream specialized for object identification, categorization, off-line reason and 
recall, and conscious perception, and the dorsal (“how”) stream specialized for 
fluent motor interaction, in the here-and-now, with the target physically present.  
Nor, by way of an aside, is this functional compartmentalization unique to 
vision.  Rauschecker (1998) presents powerful evidence for a similar dissociation 
in audition, positing “the existence of a dorsal stream for the processing of 
auditory spatial information and a ventral stream for the processing of auditory 
patterns, including communication sounds and speech” (Rauschecker, 1998,  
516). 
 
As a final (though, as we shall see, problematic) example of these dual visual 
systems in action in normal, unimpaired subjects, consider Milner and Goodale’s 
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account of certain results involving illusory size distortions. Figure (2) shows the 
famous “Tichener circles” illusion in which we misjudge the sizes of the central 
discs.  In the topmost drawing, the two central discs are (in fact) equal in size, 
whereas in the lower drawing they are different in size.  The effect of the 
surrounding rings of large and small circles, in each case, leads us to 
perceptually misrepresent the actual size of the central discs, seeing them as 
different when they are the same (top case) and the same when they are different 
(bottom case). 
 
Fig. 2  Diagram showing the ‘Tichener circles’ illusion.  In the top figure 
the two central discs are of the same actual size, but appear different; in 
the bottom figure, the disc surrounded by an annulus of large circles has 
been made somewhat larger in size in order to appear approximately 
equal in size to the other central disc.  (From Milner & Goodale 1995. By 
permission). 
 
Conscious visual experience, in this case, delivers a content which seems to 
misrepresent the actual size of the center discs  This misrepresentation surely 
occurs within the conscious visual experience itself.  For we are capable of 
altering our conceptual judgment without thereby altering the way the visual 
scene appears to us in perceptual experience.  Once we know about the illusion 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Milner and Goodale (1995) is, in effect, an extended defense of just this claim.  A related way of 
describing the functional separation is offered by Zeki (1993), who also posits two ‘form’ systems, one (the 
ventral stream) treating form in association with color and static properties, the other (the dorsal stream) 
concerned with ‘dynamic’ form and motion – see also Jeannerod  1997, 20.  Jeannerod  endorses the idea of 
these dual visual pathways but lays a greater emphasis (than Milner and Goodale) on the interactions 
between the two systems.  Jeannerod  agrees, however, on the description of the dorsal system as 
specialized for vision-for-action (Jeannerod 1997, 11, 20) and on the special role of the ventral stream in 
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we may judge that the center circles in the topmost picture are identical in size 
despite the persistence, in our conscious visual experience, of the illusion But 
now let’s add a surprising twist. 
 
Aglioti et al (1995) set up a version of the illusion using thin poker chips as the 
discs, and asked subjects to “pick up the target disc on the left if the two discs 
appeared equal in size and to pick up the one on the right if they appeared 
different in size” (Milner and Goodale 1995, 167).  The surprising upshot was 
that even when subjects were unaware of – but clearly subject to – the illusion, 
their motor control systems produced a precision grip with a finger-thumb 
aperture perfectly suited to the actual size of the disc.  This aperture was not 
arrived at by tactile means, but was instead the direct result of fine-grained, 
visually-guided adjustments.  Yet it reflected not the illusory disc size given in 
the subject’s visual experience, but the actual size.  In short: 
Grip size was determined entirely by the true size of the 
target disc [and] the very act by means of which subjects 
indicated their susceptibility to the visual illusion (that is, 
picking up one of two target circles) was itself uninfluenced 
by the illusion. 
 (Milner and Goodale 1995, 168) 
 
 
This is, it seems to me, a somewhat startling result. If the Milner and Goodale 
story is accepted, there is at least a prima facie problem certain readings of EBC 
                                                                                                                                                 
processing object-identity (Jeannerod 1997, 148).  We shall return to the complex topic of the interactions 
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(the assumption of experience-based control).  For it is no longer clear that 
conscious visual experience is deeply linked to the fine-grained control of motor 
action.. The kind of coding and processing implicated in the real-time guidance 
of delicate, fluent, object-engaged action is, it now seems, frequently and 
significantly distinct from that which supports our ongoing perceptual 
experience of the scene.  Indeed, the two can often conflict with little or no effect 
on the fluent, world-engaging action.  As a result the inner resources that 
determined (for example) the shape and character of Cussins’ motorcyclist’s 
multiple micro-adjustments of speed and tension (section 1 above) may turn out 
to be surprisingly independent of those that determined the character of her 
ongoing perceptual experience.  In such cases, the nonconceptual content of our 
perceptual experience, although genuinely and importantly distinct from the 
contents of our propositional judgments, is by no means identical with fine 
action-guiding contents either. More generally, the contents of conscious visual 
experience may play no ongoing role in the fine tuning of our object-engaged 
motor behaviors. When, to recall the opening image from O’Shaugnessy, we 
continue to look as we bring our finger down onto the center of the printed cross, 
we may be looking so as continuously to feed visual information to a thoroughly 
non-conscious action-guiding system - a kind of vision-using zombie, to borrow 
Gaazzaniga’s (1998) characterization. The functional role of conscious seeing, if 
this is correct, is simply not as we might have imagined. 
                                                                                                                                                 
between the dorsal and ventral streams in Section 4. 
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3. Weighing The Evidence 
 
Perhaps we need to clarify, or even radically re-configure, our understanding of 
the links between conscious visual experience and here-and-now visually guided 
action. Before undertaking such a task, however, it is wise to ask ourselves: just 
how compelling is the empirical evidence just presented, and what exactly does 
it demonstrate or suggest? In particular, the difficulty (see below) of interpreting 
the dramatic experiment involving the Tichener circles will illustrate the need for 
due qualification and for wideranging attention to all the evidence now in play.  
 
Before proceeding, it is worth sounding a small note of caution. The Tichener 
Circles case study, it needs to be stressed, is just one small brick in a densely 
constructed wall of evidence (it occupies, to give you a sense, just 4 pages of the 
250 page treatment by Milner and Goodale (1995)). I have tried to present a 
wider and more balanced body of evidence. Nonetheless, certain worries 
concerning the illusory size distortions example may have a rather wider 
significance, and can help lead us towards a more nuanced view of the functional 
role of visual experience. 
 
One worry about the use of the Tichener circle experiment (first suggested to me 
by Christopher Peacocke and Martin Davies (personal communications)) 
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concerns the precise nature of the putative misrepresentation. If we allow, for 
example, that a single perceptual experience may present multiple inconsistent 
contents, then we need not accept that there is (in the experience) any 
misrepresentation of the actual size of the center disc. It is possible (to take the 
bottom-most case in the diagram) that the size of each disc is given correctly in 
experience, but that we are prone to an illusion concerning (only) the relative 
sizes of the two discs. That is to say, each disc is represented as being the size it 
is, but we misrepresent the relation as one of (in this case) sameness rather than 
difference. 
 
A neat way to illustrate the kind of possibility in question has been presented by 
Smeets and Brenner (2001) using a modified version of the Muller-Lyer illusion 
(fig 3 below). 
 
Fig. 3. The Brentano version of the Muller-Lyer illusion is an 
example of the inconsistent perception of physically related spatial 
attributes such as extent and positions. The alignment of the points 
of the arrows in (a) with the vertical lines in (b) is based on the 
perceived positions of the line intersections, whereas the bisection 
of the horizontal lines is based on the perceived extent of the line 
segments.(From Smeets and Brenner 2001.By permission of the 
authors and of Elsevier Science Ltd) 
 
 
In this version of the famous illusion, the addition of two vertical lines, aligned 
with the arrowheads and bisecting an additional horizontal line yields a display 
in which: 
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The vertical lines and the points of the arrows appear to be exactly aligned 
(which they are). The central vertical line...appears to divide the 
horizontal line in two equal parts (which it does). Nevertheless the central 
arrow...seems to bisect the upper horizontal line in two unequal parts 
(which it doesn’t). 
(Smeets and Brenner 2001,287) 
 
The various spatial contents made available to our conscious visual awareness 
are thus inconsistent. A similar result could, as a reader for this journal has 
pointed out, be obtained for the Tichener circles simply by adding two parallel 
lines tangent to both center circles on opposite sides. Our conscious visual 
experience may thus comprehend multiple, not necessarily consistent, 
components. As to which of these components is then implicated in some specific 
response, that may well vary with  the task, the context, and the expertise of the 
agent. Caution is therefore indicated, since the fact that performance on a given 
task seems to suggest that we are not consciously aware of something (such as 
the correct size of the circles) may be misleading. Choose a different task and we 
may get a different answer. 
 
All this leads, rather naturally, towards a second, and even more general, kind of 
reservation. Milner and Goodale depict a single, stable, strong dissociation 
between the neural resources used for conscious seeing and those used for on-
line, object-engaged visuomotor control. But several experiments suggest that 
what we actually confront may be more closely akin to a task-variable 
recruitment of different resources. Thus, contrary to a maximal reading of the 
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Milner and Goodale results, recent evidence suggest that conscious visual 
illusions do influence grasp, although only to a small degree.  Thus consider Ellis 
et al (1999) – a study involving illusions in which visual experience 
misrepresents the centerpoint of a bar due to the presence of a misleading 
background (the ‘Ponzo’ illusion (Brenner and Smeets (1996)) or other 
misleading cues (such as those presented by a variant of the famous Müller-Lyer 
illusion developed by Judd (1899)).  Ellis et al found that visually-based 
judgments of the centerpoint of the bars were indeed skewed, just like the 
judgment of relative size in the Titchener circles case.  But they also found that 
subjects’ attempts to grasp the bars at the centerpoint were not (pacé Milner and 
Goodale) completely uninfluenced by the illusion.  Grasp-points were 
significantly more veridical (closer to the real centerpoint of the bar) than 
estimates grounded in visual perception, but they were even more veridical in the 
control (no illusory backdrops) condition.  Ellis et al thus conclude that the visual 
illusion does influence the action systems, but that the action (grasp) system must 
also have access to more veridical information and that the results obtained 
reflect the interaction between the two.  The image is one of “partial rather than 
absolute dissociation” between vision-for-action and vision-for-perception, such 
that “the motor system has access to both the illusory perceptual information 
(presumably obtained from the ventral stream) and the veridical information 
(presumably obtained from the dorsal stream)”( Ellis et al 1999,113).  More 
generally, Jeannerod (1997) offers a variety of evidence likewise favoring a 
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greater degree of interaction between vision-for-perception (specifically, object 
recognition) and vision-for-action (specifically, the use of spatial information for 
object-relative (“allocentric”) navigation) – see Jeannerod 1997, 88-92.  Finally, 
Decety and Grèzes (1999) use PET neuroimaging studies to support the 
conclusion that the degree of dissociation and segregation of labor between the 
dorsal and ventral pathways depends crucially on the nature of the activity.  
When perception has a clear, explicit problem-solving goal, intense segregation 
of labor is observed.  But “when perception has no explicit goal…both visual 
pathways are found to be implicated” (Decety and Grèzes 1999, 177).  The nature 
and extent of dorsal-ventral interaction may thus depend in part on the task at 
hand, rather than being a fixed feature of human vision8. 
 
The most significant reservations concerning the very strongest forms of the dual 
visual systems hypothesis are thus twofold: 
 
1. The possibility that conscious visual experience involves multiple, potentially 
inconsistent, contents. 
and: 
                                                 
8   Carey 2001 offers  a balanced review of the data concerning visual illusions and concludes that most, 
though not all, of the new  evidence is fully compatible with a strong, dual visual systems hypothesis. 
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2. The idea of task-specific recruitment of resources, and hence of a task-
variable relationship between the contributions of the dorsal and ventral 
streams. 
 
Taking both these worries on board, we would end up with a potentially shifting 
boundary between the conscious and nonconscious uses of visual information, 
and with a methodological challenge in plotting the precise contents of visual 
awareness (since different experimental designs might probe different (and 
potentially inconsistent) conscious contents). 
 
Such complications and caveats do not, however, undermine the central 
challenge to EBC. For that challenge depends only upon the general (and more-
or-less uncontroversial) idea of visually-guided yet non-conscious, fine-action-
controlling systems. And this idea is fully compatible both with a physiological 
story involving on-the-spot, task-specific recruitment of resources, and with the 
presence, within conscious visual awareness, of multiple inconsistent contents.  
Conscious visual experience may indeed present multiple inconsistent contents. 
But in so doing, it need not present any of those contents in a computational 
format apt for use in the fine control of on-line, skilled motor action. 
 
Moreover, this general story is one that enjoys widespread cognitive scientific 
support (see for example  Zeki (1993) Jeannerod (1997),  Gazzaniga (1998) , 
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Decety and Grezes (1999), Carey (2001) and many more). The story also has some 
intuitive appeal, once we reflect of expert sports performance, driving skills etc. 
What is increasingly apparent (see especially Gazzaniga 1998) is that the 
involvement, in our daily activities, of these non-conscious, fine-action guiding 
systems is immense and pervasive. It is sufficiently immense and pervasive, in 
fact, as to render initially puzzling the functional role of conscious vision itself. 
 
For Milner and Goodale, this latter amounts to a question concerning the 
functional role of the coding in the ventral stream, and (hence) of the nature of 
the interactions between this stream and its dorsal cousin. But the question of 
how conscious seeing interacts with the on-line control of skilled action is, 
clearly, a much more general one which may be addressed independently of 
these specific physiological conjectures.  
 
Let us begin, though, with Milner and Goodale’s own suggestion. Despite their 
overall stress on the relative independence of the dorsal and ventral visual 
streams, Milner and Goodale accept that there has to be some kind of important 
interaction between the two.  As they themselves comment (Milner and Goodale 
1995, 201-204), the two streams must act harmoniously, non-competitively and – 
in some sense – co-operatively.  Even the neuroanatomy exhibits multiple 
instances of cross-connectivity between the streams, and displays certain 
neuroanatomical areas as common ground between the two (areas such as V3A 
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and MT – see Felleman and Van Essen 1991).  This makes obvious functional 
sense.  We are clearly able to factor stored high-level information into basic 
action routines, for example when our reach and grip is adjusted to the known 
weight and slipperiness of a visually encountered object. In this vein, Milner and 
Goodale (1995, 202) explicitly allow that part of the process of visuomotor 
grasping probably involves “the transfer of high-level visual information 
between the two streams,” and add that: 
Understanding these interactions would take us some way 
towards answering what is one of the central questions in 
modern neuroscience: how is sensory information 
transformed into purposeful acts? 
 (Milner and Goodale 1995,202) 
 
 
The immediate question, then, is how to capture the shape of the crucial 
interactions. Milner and Goodale’s  suggestion is that such interaction occurs 
largely at the level of target and action-type selection.  Roughly speaking, the 
conscious visual contents (supported, they claim, by activity within the ventral 
stream) are said to figure prominently in our selection of goal-objects and in our 
choice of types of action, while a largely independent (and, they suggest, dorsal 
stream based) coding provides the spatial and physical form information needed 
for the fine-grained control and maintenance of the ensuing activity.  The process 
of selection of objects to be acted upon may, it is speculated, involve mechanisms 
of attention that “flag” the goal-object and initiate the retrieval of whatever high-
level information needs to be factored into the visuomotor routine.  The act of 
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grasping a fork, for example (see Milner and Goodale 1995, 203) requires not 
simply the provision of an accurate precision grip, but a grip appropriate to the 
intended use of the fork.9 And this requires the dorsal stream to be influenced by 
the high-level products of ventral stream processing.  Interaction thus occurs, 
and is vital to normal functioning.  But the influence is high-level and does not 
(contrary to one way of unpacking the notion of the nonconceptual content of 
perceptual experience) involve the use of a rich, common (nonconceptual) 
content-base both to guide fine-grained action and to support the  phenomenal 
experience. 
 
This broad notion of a relatively high-level ‘executive’ interaction between 
conscious seeing and fine-grained motor control is, I suggest, highly attractive. It 
can be maintained, moreover, even while accepting the twin caveats mentioned 
earlier. And it helps make sense of those interesting linkages (remarked several 
times in the text) between conscious visual awareness and memory, and of the 
equally interesting dissociations between both of these (on the one hand) and 
fine-tuned, object-engaging action (on the other). 
 
                                                 
9 Sirigu, et al, 1995 describes a patient who looks to have intact processing in both the dorsal and ventral 
streams, but to suffer from impaired interaction between the two.  This patient can grasp objects fluently, 
and can name objects, but will often display an efficient (well-calibrated) grip that is inappropriate to the 




Thus consider Prinz’s  suggestion that “the key to connecting consciousness with 
action might involve memory systems rather than motor systems” ( Prinz 2000, 
252 ). Prinz’s idea is that conscious awareness is intimately bound up with the 
use of attentional systems to put sensory systems into contact with working and 
episodic memory. Such contact developed, he conjectures, so as to allow stored 
memories of specific incidents to guide planning and action-selection. It was the 
relatively recent co-evolution of consciousness and new memory systems 
(especially episodic memory) that, on this account, then freed certain creatures 
from the here-and-now, and opened the doors to planning and reason as we 
know them. The upshot was to drive a new wedge between sensing and acting, 
rendering the relation at times indirect. The functional role of conscious visual 
perception, on this model, is to support reason, recall and reflection. It is only 
indirectly to guide (better, to select) actions in the here-and-now. 
 
Such indirect modes of influence would include, as Milner and Goodale suggest, 
the selection of action types and of targets. The apparently fine detail (but see 
recent work on ‘change blindness’ for some highly relevant doubts about this 
appearance of  rich visual detail10) of our conscious visual awareness is not, if 
this is correct, the ongoing driving force behind our successful object-oriented 
manipulations. Instead, conscious seeing  makes its contribution at a rather more 
                                                 
10  See for example  Simons and Levin  (1997). 
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executive level: a level which guides my behavior only in the same sense as my 
love of pasta may be said to guide my selection of a menu item. 
 
Despite the caveats, then, I think there exists a strong empirical case for the 
operation of two fairly distinct visual systems underlying human performance. If 
this is so, then we do indeed need to clarify, or perhaps revise, the assumption of 
Experience-Based Control (EBC). In the next, and final, section, I attempt such a 
reformulation, and canvass the implications for some philosophical projects. 
 
4. Re-thinking Experience and Action11 
 
The functional role of conscious visual perception, I have argued, is not quite as 
it sometimes seems. For although it may seem as if conscious seeing is what 
continuously and delicately guides our fine-tuned motor activity, such on-line 
control may be largely and typically devolved to distinct, non-conscious, visual 
input using systems. Conscious visual experience, by contrast, is delicately 
geared to knowing the visual scene in ways appropriate for planning, recall, and 
reason-based action selection. And it is only in this rather indirect sense that 
conscious seeing may be said to guide our actions. The potentially misleading 
                                                 
11 Special thanks to Martin Davies , Chris Peacocke,  and an anonymous referee  for helping to clarify 




formulation in EBC (section 1 above) should thus be replaced with something 
more transparent, such as: 
 
Hypothesis of Experience-based Selection (EBS) 
 
Conscious visual experience presents the world to a subject in a form 
appropriate for the reason-and-memory based selection of actions. 
 
 
The explicit replacement of EBC with EBS is, I believe, a positive step in the 
large-scale philosophical project of understanding the nature of (and the links 
between) conscious perception, action and reason. It is a step, moreover, which 
has clear implications for  existing work. 
 
Thus, regarding the (putative) nonconceptual contents of conscious visual 
experience, EBS clearly favors at most a rather indirect account of the relation 
between such contents and profiles of world-engaging action. Thus whereas 
Cussins (1990) (1998)) seeks to cash out the nonconceptual aspects of visual 
experience by appeal to very fine-grained capacities to move and react (recall the 
motorcyclist’s multiple ‘microadjustments’), EBS must incline us towards a more 
indirect account, perhaps along the lines of Peacocke (1992a,b). In Peacocke’s 
account the link between content and action is routed via the distinct 
 29
intermediary stage of (for the visual case) spatial reasoning.  It is not the actual or 
potential actions of the subject which thus determine the correctness of specific 
assignments of nonconceptual content, so much as the way those experiences 
inform episodes of spatial reasoning. Such reasoning, in all the central cases 
Peacocke discusses, crucially involves the presence of specific demonstrative 
beliefs and desires: the belief that that tree is located in that part of (egocentrically 
identified) physical space, etc. (see Peacocke 1992b,131).  Visual perception thus 
supplies nonconceptual information which supports spatial reasoning, as when 
the subject intends to point to a certain tree and – courtesy of the experientially 
presented nonconceptual information – forms the intention to move her arm in 
an appropriate (again nonconceptually identified) direction. 
 
Martin Davies (personal communication) concludes that accounts that in this 
way mediate the perception-action linkage (via the use in thought of perceptual 
demonstrative concepts) are less threatened by the apparent empirical 
dissociation12 between conscious visual experience and the on-line control of 
fine-grained visuomotor action.  The threat is by-passed, it seems, because the 
content-constituting link is now not directly between conscious visual experience 
and physical action, but between such experience and the processes of thought 
                                                 
12 A refereee notes, correctly, that the kinds of empirical story scouted in the text do not strictly speaking 
imply dissociation. The mere fact that our experiences and actions often have common causes might, for 
example, keep them associated. In speaking of dissociation, I intend only the standard cognitive 
psychological sense, in which two cognitive capacities are said to be dissociated to the extent that each can 
function independently of the other (even if, normally, they non-accidentally march in step). 
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and reasoning which may inform subsequent actions. In Peacocke's treatment the 
bonds between nonconceptual contents and patterns of possible real-world 
action  are thus much looser than those invoked by Cussins. 
 
This proposal, positing as it does a much more indirect link between the contents 
of visual experience and environmentally-engaged action, fits quite well with 
Milner and Goodale’s own conception (Section 3 above) of the role of visual 
experience in guiding action.  Guided by this account, EBS re-casts the notion of 
experience-based control so as to require only that visual experience inform our 
high-level goals and intentions13, which then flag targets for the vision-for-
action system to engage.  
 
It may seem, however, that EBS comports best of all with accounts that simply 
reject the notion of a nonconceptual component in visual experience altogether. 
For according to EBS the deep joint in our cognitive nature is between the non-
conscious, action-supporting system and the conscious system that perceives, 
experiences, categorizes, and – given a public language – issues verbal, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 In this vein, Frank Jackson suggests that for the assignment of content to mental states what matters 
about the relation between experience and action is the “distinction between behavior that does, and 
behavior that does not, count as satisfying the subject’s desires if their beliefs are true” (Jackson, personal 
communication).    
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propositional judgments.14.  On this view, categorization, awareness, experience, 
recognition and abstraction all characterize an integrated perceptual-cognitive 
system, while on-line, fine activity-guiding know-how operates from a quite 
different base. Conscious visual is, according to EBS, intrinsically poised to figure 
in processes of off-line reflection, recall and cascading abstraction (recall the 
ventral stream’s involvement in object identification, awareness, and delay-
condition responses).  As such, it is a closer cognitive neighbor to full-bloom 
conceptual content than to on-line, daily activity-guiding know-how.  
 
Where the friends of nonconceptual content aligned visual experience and 
visuomotor action, and kept these distinct from conceptual reason, EBS  thus 
invites us to align conscious visual experience and conceptual reason, and to 
keep these distinct from visuomotor action.  This empirical story recalls 
philosophical accounts that depict perceptual experience as in some sense already 
conceptualized.  For the coding that supports conscious visual experience is geared 
to the extraction of “viewer-independent” features – those relatively permanent 
features of objects (color, shape irrespective of viewing angle, etc.) that, 
plausibly, enter deeply into our perception of a world of enduring, independent 
objects.  EBS thus comports rather nicely with, for example, John McDowell’s 
                                                 
14 Fodor (1998) defends a related view . According to Fodor, having a concept is not a matter of being able 
to do anything in particular, but is rather a matter of “being able to think something.” (Fodor  1998,29, 
italics in original.) 
 
 32
depiction of perceptual experience as ‘bringing objects into view’, and as a 
process: 
 
in which objects are manifestly there for thinkers, 
immediately present to their conceptually shaped sensory 
consciousness. 
 (McDowell 1998a, 465) 
 
Conscious visual  experience, according to EBS, is already formatted, packaged 
and poised for use in conceptual thought and reason:  it is part of what Milner 
and Goodale (1998, 4) suggestively describe as a system for “insight, hindsight 
and foresight about the visual world”. The contents of conscious visual 
experience are, on this story, entirely and profoundly concept-ready.  And what 
this costs them is their ability to play a direct role in the on-line support of fluent, 
object-engaged behavior. 
 
It does not follow, however, from such contents being ‘concept-ready’ that they 
are in some sense already conceptualized: they may, that is to say, be non-
conceptual contents in good standing. Let me end, then, by mentioning one last 
(rather more radical) way in which to accommodate both EBS and something like 
a notion of the nonconceptual content of visual experience. Up to this point I 
have taken it more or less for granted that the contents of visual perceptual 
experience are exhausted by (roughly speaking) the perceived filling out of local 
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visual space.  But an ambitious theorist might try for a “thicker” notion of the 
content of the visual perceptual field.  Instead of seeing it as the simple filling out 
of visual space, an ambitious theorist might construct a kind of duplex notion of 
the character of visual experience:  a notion that involves both a relatively 
passive perceptual content (the perceived filling out of visual space) and the way 
our visual experience presents that space as an arena for fluent, engaged action15.  
Thus on visually encountering, say, a letterbox and an envelope of a certain size, 
it may be deemed part of my ordinary visual experience that the world, as thus 
presented, affords the opportunity of fluent grasping and posting.  In this sense, 
my implicit knowledge of my own potential for finely-tuned action may be 
deemed part of16 my conscious visual experience–  and this despite the fact that 
the inner representational resource supporting the sense of spatial filling-out is 
not itself the content-base for the fluent world-engaged action itself. Such 
accounts preserve something like the idea of a nonconceptual component within 
visual experience, but identify that component with implicit knowledge of 
potentials for fine-tuned action. 
 
                                                 
15 For examples of such accounts, see  Gibson (1979), Reed (1996) 
 
16  For just such an account, see O’Regan  and Noe (In Press, 2001).  Also, see Susan Hurley’s important 
(1998) account in which perceptual experience and action are woven into an especially intimate whole.  
Notice, incidentally, that nothing in the present treatment is incompatible with Hurley’s important 
suggestion that perception and action each involve whole cycles of sensory input and motor output. For 
some discussion of this, see Clark (1999). 
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Such a position is compatible with a certain reading of Evans. Thus Grush (1998) 
argues, following Evans, that many aspects of experiential content depend on 
complex links with the potential deployment of sensorimotor skills.  
Commenting on the experience of hearing a sound as pulsating, Grush 
comments that: 
…. part of the normal content of pulsatingness, for us, is that 
it is something with which we can coordinate a number of 
sensorimotor skills 
 (Grush 1998 para. 21) 
 
When we hear the beat, we are implicitly aware of our capacity, should we wish, 
to tap our fingers in time with the pulses, to anticipate the pulses, to swing a 
conductor’s baton in time with the pulses, and so on.  A person lacking all such 
skills, yet not bio-mechanically incapacitated in any way, could not (on this 
account) be said to directly perceive the sound as pulsating.  These experiences 
have the contents they do, it is concluded: 
 
 in virtue of the fact that they poise the organism to non-
inferentially engage some range of skills, and guide the organism’s 
execution of these skills, if they are executed 
  (Grush 1998, para. 23). 
 
The point to notice, then, is that all this is perfectly compatible with the kind of 
significant dissociation between conscious visual experience and sensorimotor 
action described earlier.  But it is compatible only if, once again, we are very 
careful about the claim that the experience guides the executing of the skill.  In 
line with EBS, we must unpack that notion of guidance as the high level, 
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intentional selection of action types and targets – we must depict it as the 
capacity to consciously use the perceptual array to identify goals, plan actions 
and select skilled routines (for example, a finger tapping routine), but not to 
control the fine detail of those sensorimotor routines themselves.  The ultimate 
picture, as Goodale (1998, 491) nicely notes, is reminiscent of the interaction 
between a human operator and a smart teleassistance device.  The operator 
decides on the target and action-type (for example “pick up the blue rock on the 
far left”) and the robot uses its own sensing and acting routines to do the rest.  
Knowledge of our capacity to engage such routines may, on the present account, 
be essential to the content of the experience, even if the routines themselves 




Substantial empirical evidence, I have argued, favors the replacement of the 
Assumption of Experience-Based Control (EBC) with the less ambiguous 
Hypothesis of Experience-Based Selection (EBS). EBS clarifies the functional role 
of conscious visual experience and offers a clear account of the relation between 
conscious seeing and the fine detail of on-line, object-engaging action. It depicts 
conscious seeing as tightly geared to presenting the world in ways appropriate 
for planning, reason and high-level action selection, and it helps make sense of 
the apparently deep links between certain memory systems and conscious visual 
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experience. According to EBS it is only the high-level aspects of planned, 
intentional action that are directly informed by the information provided in 
conscious visual experience.  The link between visual experience and fine-
grained visuomotor action emerges as much less direct and intimate than we 
might otherwise suspect.  A certain commonsense conception of the role of visual 
experience is thus revealed as potentially misleading, while philosophical 
theories that attempt to explain the contents of conscious perceptual experience 
by direct appeal to the control of object-engaging action are undermined.  
 
In displaying conscious visual experience as geared to thought and reason, rather 
than to the fine control of action, EBS might seem to lend strong support to 
accounts (such as McDowell (1994) (1998)) that depict perceptual content as 
already conceptualized. Such a reading, however, is not forced upon us by the 
adoption of EBS. For EBS is equally compatible, we saw, with some (but by no 
means all) ways of cashing out a notion of nonconceptual content. The simplest 
way to do so is to locate the content-constituting link not between conscious 
visual experience and the fine detail of motor action (as does Cussins (1990) 
(1998)) but between such experience and the processes of thought and reasoning 
which may subsequently inform the executive selection of such actions. 
 
The main moral of the discussion is, however, independent of such local 
disputes. It is that conscious visual perception is part and parcel of a cognitive 
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system dedicated to recall, reason and imagination, and only indirectly 
associated with the systems controlling the detailed execution of selected actions. 
Consciousness, memory, and reason thus emerge as a functionally unified 
grouping, while the on-line execution of fine motor activity calls on a distinct 
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